The sworn testimony of Frank Hester, taken under oath on March 2, 2023, provides some of the clearest evidence that United did not comply with the investigatory protections guaranteed to me under Section 23 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

This testimony is significant because Mr. Hester was not a peripheral witness. He ultimately made the decision to terminate me. Under questioning, Mr. Hester acknowledged that Section 23 of the CBA governed the investigation and that the purpose of the investigatory meeting was to provide me with a contractual opportunity to respond to the allegations and present information relevant to the investigation. He specifically acknowledged that the meeting was conducted under the contractual parameters of Section 23.

Mr. Hester further acknowledged that the contractual purpose of the February 15 meeting was to investigate the allegations by providing me an opportunity to respond. When asked whether this was the opportunity provided under Section 23, he answered, “Yes, Section 23 of the contract.”

The critical admission follows: when asked whether I ever participated in an investigatory hearing concerning the complaint against me, Mr. Hester testified unequivocally that I did not.

This admission is impossible to reconcile with Section 23 as Mr. Hester himself described it. He acknowledged that the contractual process was designed to provide me with an opportunity to respond to the allegations and present relevant information. Yet he confirmed under oath that I never participated in the required investigatory hearing.

Mr. Hester also testified that he ultimately made the decision to terminate me. He stated that, “ultimately it was my decision.”

Accordingly, the individual who ultimately decided my employment would be terminated knew that the contractual investigation existed for the purpose of allowing me to respond, knew that I had not participated in an investigatory hearing, and nevertheless proceeded with the termination.

The testimony becomes even more significant when the contractual timing provisions are examined. Mr. Hester was questioned specifically about Section 23 A.2.A, including its requirement concerning the scheduling and rescheduling of investigatory meetings. He acknowledged that the CBA provides that, absent mutual agreement, an investigatory meeting could not ordinarily be rescheduled beyond the contractual time period.

When asked whether he had knowledge of a mutual agreement between United and the Union to extend or reschedule the meeting beyond that contractual period, Mr. Hester testified that he did not have knowledge of such an agreement.

But his testimony then establishes an important contradiction.

Mr. Hester acknowledged that he was aware of AFA's contemporaneous position that the meetings had been placed on pause and were to be rescheduled. He testified that when he informed AFA representative Donna Matallana of my termination, she told him that the meetings had been put on pause. Mr. Hester further testified that he advised her to put her concerns in writing because his decision was already moving forward.

That written communication was, in fact, sent directly to Mr. Hester the following day. AFA's February 27, 2021 email memorialized that the parties understood the meetings had been placed on pause, that the required documentation had been submitted, and that AFA believed United's decision to proceed with the termination violated my contractual right to a meeting under Section 23. AFA specifically requested that my termination be rescinded and that the LOI meeting be rescheduled.

Mr. Hester's sworn testimony therefore does not merely provide a disputed interpretation of the CBA. It establishes the underlying facts:

1. Section 23 governed the investigation.
2. The purpose of the investigatory meeting was to give me an opportunity to respond to the allegations.
3. That contractual opportunity was never provided to me because I never participated in an investigatory hearing.
4. Mr. Hester ultimately made the decision to terminate me.
5. He knew AFA was asserting that the investigation had been placed on pause and that the meeting was supposed to be rescheduled.
6. AFA contemporaneously notified him in writing that proceeding with the termination violated my contractual right to a Section 23 meeting.

Most importantly, Mr. Hester's testimony confirms the central fact that cannot reasonably be disputed: United terminated me without ever giving me the contractual investigatory hearing that Mr. Hester himself acknowledged Section 23 contemplated.

This is not simply my interpretation of what happened five years ago. These are facts established through the sworn testimony of the management official who made the termination decision.

The significance of this evidence is therefore not that Mr. Hester used the precise words, “I violated the CBA.” Rather, his testimony establishes the facts demonstrating the violation: he acknowledged the contractual right, acknowledged the purpose of the contractual meeting, acknowledged that I never participated in that meeting, and acknowledged that he nevertheless made the decision to terminate me.

That evidence, combined with AFA's contemporaneous written determination that United had violated my Section 23 rights, provides substantial grounds for the Association to conduct a renewed review of my termination and the handling of my grievance.

The Union does not have to rely solely upon my characterization of the events. The record now contains the sworn testimony of the decision-maker himself.